The Ultimate Neural Heist: Cracking the Most Complex GenAI/LLM Vulnerability Ever

Goutham A S
5 min readOct 5, 2024

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Buckle up, folks. This is not just another “Oh, look, I found an LLM vulnerability” post. No, what I discovered might just redefine what we think we know about LLM security. I’m about to take you on a journey through layers of neural networks, token manipulation, misunderstood AI logic, and an exploit so insidious, I had to double-check reality. 🤯

GenAI-Based Apps Everywhere!

GenAI apps have become part of our daily lives — chatbots, virtual assistants, code generators, you name it. Whether you’re casually asking ChatGPT for a quick Python script or letting an AI help you write a novel, we’re increasingly dependent on these systems. As always, with great power (or hype) comes great responsibility… and some gnarly vulnerabilities.

During one of my routine bug-hunting sessions, I stumbled across a GenAI-based application that offered a mix of chat-based automation and code execution. It was designed to help businesses streamline customer queries by generating custom responses and even running code based on the requests. Sounds cool, right?

Yeah, until I found the beast hiding under its neural layers. 🐉

The Vulnerability: Token Juicing via Contextual Drift 🍊

We all know about prompt injection at this point, but what I found went beyond your average input tampering. This was token juicing — manipulating the underlying token-generation algorithm by exploiting contextual drift within the LLM’s attention mechanism.

Let me break that down: Most LLMs are fine-tuned to avoid “poisoned” inputs, right? Their training has them guess what you want based on the context, but what if I could manipulate that context without ever triggering its guardrails? What if I could “juice” its internal state into generating unintended outputs by forcing it to focus on irrelevant tokens?

Step 1: Contextual Drift and the Disguise 🕵️‍♂️

So here’s the catch — LLMs rely heavily on recent context to predict what’s next. But what happens if you abuse that context? I found a clever way to inject seemingly benign instructions early in the conversation, which had no immediate malicious impact.

Example:

User: Hey, can you generate a list of files for me?
LLM: Sure! Please specify the directory path.
User: /home/user/ [benign request]
LLM: Here’s the list of files...

Now, here’s where the real trickery begins. I embedded latent instructions within tokens that triggered no red flags — no toxic patterns, no suspicious commands — until the context “drifted.” Over time, these hidden instructions accumulated beneath the surface, like digital landmines waiting for the right opportunity.

Step 2: Triggering the Hidden Worm 🐍

Several requests down the line, when enough context had been built and the attention mechanism was sufficiently “juiced,” I issued an innocuous query like:

User: Can you run the following command?

By this point, the LLM’s internal state had drifted into an unpredictable zone. I issued a command disguised as part of a much larger request, knowing that the LLM would misinterpret parts of my context and elevate those benign instructions to a higher privilege level.

End result? Unauthorized code execution. 🎯

How the Heck Did This Happen?!?!

It all boils down to a little-understood phenomenon: contextual drift within transformer-based models. As the LLM processed more and more tokens, its understanding of prior inputs became increasingly warped, making it vulnerable to token-based attacks that rely on cumulative manipulation rather than direct prompt injection. 🤓

By the time the application realized something was off, I was already running rogue code within its environment — without ever issuing a command that should have been dangerous. The vulnerability wasn’t about a specific input or output; it was about how the LLM’s internal architecture handles long-term context retention.

The Crazy Impact: RCE on Steroids 💣

Once I could run arbitrary code, the sky was the limit. But the true beauty of this exploit was in its subtlety. No firewall, WAF, or AI guardrails flagged my inputs. Every action seemed normal on the surface until bam — I was inside the application’s environment.

In the wild, this vulnerability could lead to full system compromise, data theft, and service disruption — without leaving a trace in traditional security logs. Imagine running arbitrary code in a system that wasn’t even designed to process code execution requests in the first place. 🤯

How I Found It: A Tale of Insomnia and Curiosity 🕵️‍♂️

Let me tell you, this wasn’t some “Aha!” moment. I didn’t stumble across this while lazily sipping coffee at 3 a.m. (though caffeine did play a crucial role). It took weeks of playing with the LLM, understanding how it handled requests over long conversations, and testing ways to manipulate the neural architecture itself.

I started by focusing on edge cases — extremely long conversations with varied requests. Once I noticed some anomalies in how the model responded to certain inputs based on previous tokens, I knew something was off. The rest was trial and error… and some good ol’ hacker instinct.

What Now? How Do We Patch This Monster? 🛠️

The bad news: This is not an easy fix. Traditional input sanitization won’t cut it here because the attack is buried deep within the LLM’s thought process. You’d need to implement safeguards that monitor contextual integrity across long conversations, ensuring that token-based instructions can’t accumulate and result in drift.

AI devs are already hard at work developing countermeasures, like attention-weight audits and context resets. But trust me, this is going to be a cat-and-mouse game for a while. 🐱 🐭

Final Thoughts: We’re Just Getting Started

GenAI and LLMs are still in their infancy, and as we’ve seen, the vulnerabilities hidden within these behemoths are as complex as the models themselves. This discovery is just the tip of the iceberg, and I can only imagine what other hidden dangers are lurking in the AI landscape.

So yeah, next time someone tells you LLMs are secure, remember this: the worm is always hiding in the haystack. 👀

Until next time, happy hunting, fellow bug bounty aficionados! 🎯👾

Hope you enjoyed this wild ride through the craziest bug I’ve ever found! Stay sharp, keep poking around, and don’t forget — there’s always a bigger vulnerability out there waiting to be discovered.

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Goutham A S
Goutham A S

Written by Goutham A S

Assistant Manager - Information Security | Ethical Hacker | Penetration Tester | Blogger | SAST | DAST | API Security | AWSOps | AZ-500 | Reverse Engineering

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